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Animal Disease Related Pre event Investment and Post-event 
Compensation: A Multi-agent Problem 
Animal disease management involves both the potential adoption of pre event 
investments in disease prevention as well as post event participation in disease management 
including slaughter of infected animals. Both types of participation, while desirable from an 
industry wide viewpoint, are undertaken by individuals and may require compensation to occur 
at an appropriate level. Current compensation policy does not provide individual farmers 
incentives to invest in prevention actions, rather concentrating on compensation for slaughtered 
animals. This paper considers compensation design incorporating the risk and economic interests 
of both the government and the producer. In particular, this study investigates possible linkages 
between preventive investments and the post event compensation package.  It also reviews the 
economic dimensions of the compensation problem and derives the optimal compensation 
package that induces individual producers to both truthfully disclose information on livestock 
disease and increase preventive investments.  
Compensation and animal disease management. Once an outbreak of animal disease 
occurs government agencies frequently come into an area and slaughter all infected and contact 
animals. The Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution requires the government to compensate 
individuals when private property is taken for public use. USDA Animal and Plant Health 
Inspection Service (APHIS) designs and executes compensation that largely relies on diagnosis 
technology and farmers' self reporting to identify and trace the infected animals (Kuchler and 
Hamm 2000). In such a case an efficient compensation scheme needs to arrive at payments that 
are (a) low enough to prevent individual farmers from over-reporting, transporting animals from 
areas outside the event and contact zones, or manufacturing diseased animals; and (b) high   3 
enough to prevent under-reporting or hiding potentially sick animals. There is observational 
evidence showing compensation levels influence individual behavior: (a) Reaney (1998) reported 
that farmers are under pressure not to report cases of BSE due to a reduction of compensation for 
sick animals; (b) Stecklow (1998) reported that cattle farmers were paid more than the sick 
animal were worth so that there was no incentive to send a sick animal to the slaughterhouse; and 
(c) Kuchler and Hamm (2000) and Wineland, Detwiler and Salman (1998) observe that 
individual farmers increase their efforts to find scrapie-infected sheep within their flocks as the 
indemnity payments increase. Therefore, an appropriate and efficient compensation scheme is 
needed to ensure a truthful disclosure of privately hold information about animal disease and its 
management.  
Compensation and animal disease prevention. Individual farmers may be reluctant to 
make pre event investments to prevent, control, or eradicate animal disease in their herd due to 
some mixture of the following reasons: (a) Investments cost money and margins are low. When 
an outbreak of animal disease like foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) occurs, a centralized control 
effort slaughters all contact animals no matter whether these animals are sick or not. In this 
sense, once the outbreak occurs the ex ante investment does not reduce the consequential loss----
two farmers having an identical herd bear the same cost regardless one invests ex ante while 
another one does not; (b) The ability to benefit from the efforts of others associated with disease 
prevention and control (free ride) reduces individual producer incentives to investing ex ante; 
and (c) Current disease control policies and indemnity payments do not provide individuals with 
incentives to invest ex ante. The 2002 farm bill, Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 
2002, Title X, Subtitle E, Animal Health Protection Act, Public Law 107-171, states that the 
government is to pay fair market value for animals destroyed for disease control purposes and   4 
any compensation paid is to be reduced by any other funds received. Other funds would include 
any salvage value, indemnity paid by states or insurance. Thus, two individual farmers who have 
identical herds and claim for compensation will receive the same amount of indemnity no matter 
one has a far better preventive investment than another one, or one who has insurance will 
receive the difference net of the indemnity paid by the insurance.  
Thus, current plans for compensation face two possible problems: (a) they may not 
induce a truthful disclosure regarding livestock disease outbreak; and (b) they do not provide a 
linkage between the ex ante preventive investment and ex post compensation scheme that might 
enhance preventive investment and reduce the likelihood of disease outbreaks and/or decrease 
the consequential event costs.  
 In this paper, we employ a game-theoretic principal agent framework to analyze the 
individual farmer and governmental behavior pre- and post-animal disease outbreak. As agents, 
individual farmers maximize their expected monetary value including compensation for 
preventive investments and post-event animal slaughter. Government, as the principal, 
maximizes overall societal welfare. In this setting we will examine the gap between the privately 
optimal and socially optimal investment levels then investigate how a well-designed 
differentiated compensation scheme can close this gap. We also discuss whether and how the 
government can monitor and assess the privately held investment information, including 
preventive technology related methods and economic screening and monitoring.    
1  The Model 
  The game-theoretic framework is summarized in Figure 1. It evolves in three 
stages. In the first stage, aiming to maximize profits  and avoid risk individual farmer k (of which   5 
there are K) considers preventative investments that reduce the likelihood of disease outbreak 
and the consequential loss. There are various preventive biosecurity actions that farmers could 
undertake, including inspecting arriving lots of animals to keep infected animals off the farm, 
installing animal identification devices to facilitate animal tracking, and improving management-
based activities that contribute to biosecurity. The other player is the relevant government 
agency, in this case APHIS, that designs the compensation scheme. Unlike the current practice, 
we assume that compensation can be conditional on the level of preventive investment and the 
severity of disease prevalence qk. Individual farmers know the disease prevalence qk in their 
herds. However, qk is privately held information, and is not observable at no cost to the 
government. In the second stage, market observations will reveal whether there is a disease 
outbreak. The likelihood of disease outbreak, which is denoted byr , is affected by the total 
preventive investment, i.e.,  ) (
1 ∑ = =
K
k k I r r . An increase in the total preventive investment 





.  If farmers report an infection, 
the government will test the herds to identify the true disease prevalence and respond in a 
manner consistent with the disease management protocol. Since the true disease prevalence will 
be found no matter whether farmers truthfully report or not as long as they decide to disclose 
disease prevalence, farmers have no gain to under-estimate the disease prevalence and they will 
truthfully disclose their infected herds. Farmers who do not disclose the disease prevalence will 
face inspections. If an infected herd is found in inspections, we assume that an individual farmer 
has to pay a certain monetary penalty. If a disease outbreak like FMD is confirmed, a quarantine 
zone is determined and movement bans are imposed, and all the animals within the quarantine 


















Figure 1: The timeline of the model 
1.1  Agent’s Problem and Privately Optimal Preventive Investment 
As agents, individual farmers maximize their expected monetary value considering 
preventive investments, post-event animal slaughter, and compensation. The payoffs of an 
individual farmer who has an initial wealth Y k  and invests I k  on preventive biosecurity actions 
under different scenarios are illustrated in Figure 2. Under the first scenario when there is no 
disease outbreak, the preventive investment is foregone and the individual net wealth is I Y k k - . 
Should a disease outbreak occur, his livestock may be slaughtered for disease control and, hence, 
resulting in a consequential loss that could be at least partly recouped from compensation paid by 
the government ) , ( qk k I R . If the incidence of a disease in the herd is disclosed the farmer bears a 
loss of  ) , ( qk k I C  where  ) , ( qk k I C  includes the direct livestock loss and some governmental 
costs. Hence, under the second scenario when there is a disease outbreak, an individual farmer 
who discloses infected herds has a net payoff  ) , ( ) , ( q q k k k k k k I C I R I Y - + - . On the other hand, 
if an individual farmer does not report disease prevalence, he bears the consequential loss 
· Possible outbreak: probability of disease outbreak in the region  ) (
1 ∑ =
K
k k I r  
· Farmers decide whether to truthfully disclose disease prevalence  k q   




· An individual farmer k incurs preventive investment I k  
· Government designs compensation scheme  ) , ( qk k I R  
· Infected and contact farmers slaughter and dispose of their animals to 
control spread 
· Farmers pay penalty if a non-disclosure of infected herds are found 
· Government pays compensation to individual farmers  ) , ( q k k I R    7 
) , ( qk k I L  and faces inspections.  If infected herds are discovered at random inspections, an 
individual farmer has to pay a monetary penalty ) (q P , and his net payoff is   
) ( ) , ( ) , ( q q q P I L I R I Y k k k k k k - - + - .  Otherwise, no disease is found in the premise and the 
individual net payoff of  ) , ( ) , ( q q k k k k k k I L I R I Y - + - .  
 
Figure 2: Payoffs of individual farmers under different scenarios  
 
It is ambiguous whether farmers face a greater consequential loss when they truthfully 
report infected herds. Despite some governmental costs, an individual farmer may bear a low 
consequential cost if he truthfully reports infected herds since it allows for appropriate response 
actions conducted by APHIS and reduces the consequential loss. No disclosure or even hiding 
sick animals will cause a wider disease spread and, thus, increases the consequential loss. 
However, covering up possible disease prevalence may avoid and/or reduce the likelihood of 
livestock slaughter and, thus dramatically reduces the consequential loss. Logically, farmers will 
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assume ( ) ( ) q q k k k k I L I C , , >  holds, and the potential penalty imposed on non-disclosure will 
induce a truthful disclosure of infected herds.  
Now suppose that the consequential loss also depends on the level of preventive 












, which implies 
that a higher preventive investment may reduce the number of infected animals and/or cause 
more timely disease management strategies, thus, reduces the consequential loss. Also suppose 










, which indicates that farmers with higher level of disease prevalence 
face higher losses.  
Unlike under current compensation practices, we assume that the magnitude of 
compensation depends the amount of preventive investment and whether farmers disclose the 
disease prevalence: (a) the higher the preventive investment, the greater the compensation that an 






. That is, among two individual farmers with identical 
herds and levels of disease prevalence, the one with the higher preventative investment would 
receive higher compensation. This assumption ensures a positive linkage between compensation 
and preventive investment thus, inducing farmers to invest more ex ante. Furthermore, an 
individual farmer who truthfully discloses disease prevalence in his herd in a timely manner will 
be compensated more than another who does not disclose. Hence, truthful disclosure of disease 
prevalence is encouraged.  
Farmers have to pay a monetary penalty  ) (q k P  if they do not disclose an infected herd 
and disease prevalence is discovered by inspections. We assume  ) (q k P  is increasing with the   9 






indicates detection is more likely for herds with a high prevalence rate. The break even incentive 
comparability condition under which farmers will truthfully disclose disease prevalence in their 
herds is  
(1)  ( ) ( )( ) ) , ( ) , ( ) ( 1 ) ( ) , ( ) , ( ) (
) , ( ) , (
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,  
When equation (1) is satisfied, farmers have the same amount of the net payoff if they report 
infected herds or not. Equation (1) can be simplified as  
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Equation (2) shows that the optimal penalty for no-disclosure when the disease is present. The 
optimal penalty is conditional on the level of the disease prevalence rate, the difference between 
the consequential loss when disclosing or not, and disease discovery rate. Penalties can be used 
to induce the truthful disclosure if the government can obtain information of preventive 
investment and disease prevalence by inspections and/or other mechanisms. If it is the case, 
farmers will always truthfully report the infected herd to avoid penalty and, thus, penalty is used 
as a credible threat and it is actually never executed.  
Farmers choose the optimal preventive investment to maximize their expected benefit 
conditional on truthful disclosure of disease prevalence resulting from the credible optimal 
penalty:   10 
(3)  
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The Lagrangian for this private maximization problem is  
(4)   ( ) ( )
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wherel  is the shadow value of the constraint on truthful disease disclosure. The necessary first-
order condition with respect to preventive investment I k   is 
(5)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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Equation (5) shows that the privately optimal preventive investment is achieved when the 
marginal gain on the right-hand side equals the marginal cost on the left-hand side. The marginal 
gain can be decomposed into three components, including those through compensation, 
consequential loss, and penalty. An increase in the individual preventive investment decreases 































k k q , and also boosts the regional preventive investment level and, 
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, ,  is positive, while the sign of   11 
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r ,
, , is not determined yet 
depending on the magnitudes of two components. The last term on the right-side hand of 
equation (5) reflects the marginal change through penalty. An increase in the preventive 
investment will decrease the consequential loss and may change the optimal amount of penalty.  
1.2  Principal’s Optimization Problem and Socially Optimal Preventive 
Investment 
The government, as a principal, maximizes expected overall societal welfare. The social welfare 
has two components, the aggregated benefit among farmers and the budgetary outlays. The 
government does not have perfect information on disease prevalence in individual herds unless 
they conduct inspections. However, the distribution of disclosed disease prevalence (q k )  is 
public information, and we assume follows a density function  ) (q k f . Based on farmers’ 
expected benefit that is written in equation (3), the aggregated welfare across farmers, denoted 
byw1, is given as 
(6)  ( ) ( ) ∫ ∑ ∑ ∑




































k k k k k
K
i k
k r r . 
In addition to compensation, we assume another two sources of budgetary outlays. The 
first one is the cost of inspections, denoted by INSP, which ensures the credibility of penalty to 
induce truthful disclosure of disease prevalence. The second source of budgetary outlays is the 
cost of obtaining preventive investment on randomly inspected farmers, which is denoted by C. 
Thus, the total budget outlay is  
(7)   C INSP ds s f s I R w
K
k





2 ) ( ) , ( .   12 
Following Hyde and Vercammen (1997), Baron and Myerson (1982), and Cramig, 
Horan, and Wolf (2005), we specify the social welfare maximization problem for the 
government by incorporating the budgetary outlays. That is, the government maximizes the sum 
of the expected benefit aggregating across farmers and the weighted budgetary outlays by 
choosing the socially optimal preventive investment conditional on the truthful disclosure of 
disease prevalence: 
(8)   
{ }
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whereg  is the weight that government applies to budgetary outlays. The Lagrangian for the 
government’s social welfare maximization problem is  
(9)   [ ] ) (   ) (   ) , ( ) , ( 2 1 q a q q q l g k k k k k k P I L I C w w L - - + - = . 
Following Holmstrom (1979), pointwise optimization with respect to preventive investment I k    
yields the following necessary first-order condition,  
(10) 
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which holds for q k  where k=1, 2,…,K.  
Equation (10) is similar to equation (5) except there is additional term in the marginal effect 















k k q g  that captures the effect of preventive investment 
through the budgetary outlays.    13 
1.3  Comparison between Privately and Socially Optimal Preventive Investment 
Now let’s examine optimal preventive investment levels for the three parties: 
(11)  
investment   preventive   optimal socially  best    second
investment   preventive   optimal socially  best  first 
investment   preventive   optimal privately 


















k  is the socially optimal investment when there no constraints on the government’s problem. 
That is, the government is not constrained by truthful disclosure or the budget. I
ss*
k  is defined as 
the second best socially optimal investment when the government has no budgetary constraint. 
Based on equations (5) and (10) we are able to write out the effect of preventive investment on 
the expected individual benefit WP and the total social welfare w under two scenarios, 
respectively:  
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Let’s assume the privately optimal investmentI
p
k
*, which is implicitly defined by equation (5), is 
achieved. Hence, equation (12-a) equals zero. Substituting I
p
k
* into equations (12-b) and (12-c) 
yields the following inequalities, 
(13-a)   { } ( ) { } ( ) { } 0
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(13-b) 
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Based on inequalities (13-a) and (13-b) we are able to compare the magnitudes of three different 
levels of preventive investment: 







* * * > > .  
Hence, we find that the positive linkage between compensation and preventive investment has 
the following effects: (a) it induces a higher investment ex ante than the second best socially 





* * > ; and (b) When the 
government does not face any budgetary constraint, the first best socially optimal investment is 





* * > .  Therefore, a well-
designed differentiated compensation scheme that is positively linked with preventive investment 
can induce private investment to increase approaching the first best socially optimal level. 
2  Implications for Compensation Policy  
In previous section we assume that farmers who do not disclosure face a penalty that optimally 
depends on disease prevalence and the level of preventive investment. What is the logic behind 
this assumption? Farmers who choose not to report face inspections. These inspections allow for 
identifying the true disease prevalence if there is any but are costly. However, it may be harder 
for the government to obtain information on ex ante preventive investment, since farmers may 
simply do not want to report that information, or they may over-report the investment level in 
order to receive a higher compensation. Besides the costs, whether the government can truthfully   15 
obtain such privately-hold investment information partly depends on technologies of prevention 
strategies. For example, it is much easier to figure out the costs of inspection or animal 
identification investment than the cost of management-based biosecurity investment. Thus, it is 
important to differentiate different technologies of preventive investment. 
The current indemnification for livestock disease loss by USDA pays farmers on the 
basis of “fair market value” for any loss resulting from public interventions to combat disease 
spread. It does not provide farmers with incentives to truthfully disclose their infected herds, or 
invest in preventive actions. Our theoretic model suggests that adding these features would be 
desirable, which is consistent with findings by Cramig, Horan and Wolf (2005). They propose 
using indemnities conditional only on disease prevalence to achieve desirable levels of 
biosecurity investment and implementing optimal penalties to induce truthful disclosure of 
disease status. However, in their case both the indemnity and penalty are conditional only on 
disease prevalence. Our model indicates it would be desirable to establish:  
·  a penalty for farms where disease is found that have not disclosed disease incidence 
conditional both on the level of disease prevalence and the level of preventive investment 
that would induce truthfully disclosure of infected herd; and  
·  enhanced compensation for those using certified ex ante preventive investments that would 
induce a greater investment approaching to the first best socially optimal level.   
In order to achieve the first best socially optimal level of preventative investment, one 
possible compensation scheme would exhibit increasing marginal compensation with respect to 
preventive biosecurity investment. This form has the following two positive effects: (a) It 
provides farmers with incentives to invest more since the large part of investment can be   16 
recouped from compensation if disease outbreak occurs; and (b) An increase in preventive 
biosecurity investment narrows the difference of consequential loss between disclosing or not, 
which induces farmers to report infected herds truthfully. A high disclosure of disease status 
prevents widespread and cuts down social loss. Therefore, implementing an increase marginal 
compensation with respect to preventive biosecurity investment may improve social welfare.  
3  Concluding Remarks 
We employed a game-theoretic framework to analyze the individual farmer and 
governmental behavior pre- and post-animal disease outbreak.  Our results also show that the 
privately optimal investment is generally lower than the first best socially optimal level, and a 
well-designed differentiated compensation scheme conditional on ex ante biosecurity investment 
can induce private preventive investment at least greater than the second best socially optimal 
level when the government face constraints, or even increase approaching the first best socially 
optimal level.  
To achieve this our results suggest that compensation schemes be expanded to encompass 
features that provide incentives for ex ante biosecurity investment and ex post truthful disclosure. 
Specifically inclusion of the following two mechanisms is warranted: (a) a penalty for farms who 
are found to have disease incidence but have not disclosed that information.  In this case the 
penalty would be set based on both on the levels of disease prevalence and preventive 
investment; and (b) a positive link between the compensation ex post and preventive investment. 
Beyond our study, several topics merit future research efforts. First, it is extremely hard 
for the government to obtain information of some preventive investments such as management-
based biosecurity investment. Therefore, penalties conditional on preventive investment and   17 
disease prevalence may not efficiently induce truthful disease disclosure, and also indemnities 
conditional on preventive investment may not be easy to design and execute. In the face of this, 
further investigation should consider cases where the government cannot observe preventive 
investment but knows its distribution.  Secondly, as shown by inequality (13-b), the privately 
optimal ex ante biosecurity approaches the first best socially optimal level. But they are not the 
same level unless the marginal effect of investment on the consequential loss when disclosing 






















k k q q . It is of the government’s interest 
to identify practical mechanisms to satisfy this condition so that the privately optimal investment 
is also the first best socially optimal level.  
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